Revocation of Driver's License for Refusal of Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) Test

Revocation of Driver's License for Refusal of Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) Test The North Carolina Uniform Driver's License Act provides that any person whodrivesa vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby gives consent to a chemical analysis (provide a breath or blood sample) if charged with an implied-consent offense. Impaireddriving is an implied-consent offense. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person charged has committed the implied-consent offense, the officer may obtain a chemical analysis of the person. If the person charged with an implied consent offense refuses to submit to a chemical analysis, his or her license will be revoked for twelve months. However, the person charged may request a hearing before the DMV to contest the revocation. If the revocation for a willful refusal is sustained after the hearing, the person whose license has been revoked has the right to file a petition in the superior court within 30 days thereafter for a hearing on the record, at which the superior court review shall be limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's findings of fact and whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact and whether the Commissioner committed an error of law in revoking the license. On appeal from a DMV hearing, the superior court sits as an appellate court. Accordingly, court of appeals review of the decision of the superior court is to be conducted as in other cases where the superior court sits as an appellate court. Under this standard, we conduct the following inquiry: (1) determining whether the trial court exercised the appropriate scope of review and, if appropriate, (2) deciding whether the court did so properly. The Rules of Evidence do not apply to DMV hearings. Thus, because the Rules of Evidence do not apply at such a hearing, the trial court may consider all evidence presented to the hearing officer, without regard to whether it would be admissible in a trial. Quoting HOPKINS v THOMAS Commissioner N.C.D.M.V. Unpublished Disposition 2018 WL 710069 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In HOPKINS v THOMAS, the arresting officer alleged that the driver refused to submit to a chemical analysis after being charged with an implied consent offense (DWI ‚Äì DUI). The DMV mailed the driver a notice of license suspension for allegedly refusing to submit to a chemical analysis and the driver requested a hearing before a DMV hearing officer. The DMV hearing officer conducted a hearing, received testimony from the arresting officer and upheld the 12-month suspension of the driver's license. The Driver appealed this ruling to the Superior Court which reviewed the record of the DMV hearing and found that there was insufficient evidence to support the 12-month refusal suspension. The relevant issues considered at a DMV chemical analysis refusal hearing are limited to consideration of whether: (1) The person was charged with an implied-consent offense or the driver had an alcohol concentration restriction on the driver's license pursuant toG.S. 20-19; (2) A law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had committed an implied-consent offense or violated the alcohol concentration restriction on the driver's license; (3) The implied-consent offense charged involved death or critical injury to another person, if this allegation is in the affidavit; (4) The person was notified of the person's rights as required by subsection (a); and (5) The person willfully refused to submit to a chemical analysis. Since, the arresting officer's affidavit did not allege that petitioner had been involved in an incident causing death or critical injury to another person; issue (3) was not relevant in this case. Of the four remaining issues in HOPKINS v THOMAS, the only issue subject to dispute is (2) whether there was evidence before the DMV hearing officer that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver had committed an implied-consent offense. Therefore, the focus of the court of appeals' analysis is whether the evidence supported the hearing officer's finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that driver had committed an implied consent offense (DWI ‚Äì DUI). In resolving this issue, it is important to distinguish between the evidentiary standard required for the State to obtain a criminal conviction of a defendant for DWI, and the evidence required to establish that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a driver haddrivenwhileimpaired. A person commits the crime ofimpaired driving if he drivesany vehicle upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State: (1) While under the influence of animpairingsubstance; or (2) After having consumed sufficient alcohol that he has, at any relevant time after thedriving, an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The essential elements of DWI are: (1) Defendant wasdrivinga vehicle; (2) upon any highway, any street, or any public vehicular area within this State; (3) while under the influence of animpairingsubstance. Therefore, in order to convict a driver ofdrivingwhileimpaired, the State must present competent and admissible evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find the existence of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, an arresting officer may ask a driver to submit to a chemical test of his or her blood alcohol content (‚ BAC‚) if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the driver has committed the offense of DWI. The ‚ reasonable grounds‚ standard is the equivalent of probable cause to arrest, and is a clearly lower standard than ‚ proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‚ In a license revocation hearing, the term ‚ reasonable grounds‚ is treated the same as ‚ probable cause.‚ Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances at that moment and within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which the officer had reasonably trustworthy information are such that a prudent man would believe that the driver had committed or was committing a crime. Moreover, the existence of reasonable grounds may be based upon information given to the officer by another, the source of the information being reasonably reliable, and it is immaterial that the hearsay information itself may not be competent evidence at the criminal trial of the person arrested. As the finder of fact, the hearing officer was charged with resolving conflicts in the evidence and making determinations as to the weight and credibility of evidence, and neither the superior court nor the court of appeals is permitted to weigh the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, the court of appeals carefully reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing before the DMV hearing officer, in order to determine whether there was evidence that supported the finding that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner had committed the offense ofdrivingwhileimpaired, without consideration of whether such evidence would be admissible at trial or of evidence that might have supported a contrary conclusion. The court of appeals concluded that the following evidence, which was adduced at the hearing, was sufficient to support DMV hearing officer's decision to uphold the 12-month revocation of the driver's license. The arresting officer testified that he was dispatched to a residence near Neuse Road in Pamlico County to investigate a report of careless and recklessdriving. When he arrived at the location, the driver was present, as were Deputy Cook of the Pamlico County Sheriff's Department and Ms. Beverly Titus. The arresting officer spoke with Ms. Titus, who informed him that whiledrivingbehind the driver, she observed the driver swerve and hit a mailbox, after which she called law enforcement and followed the driver to the private residence. The arresting officer testified that Ms. Titus had given a written statement which was introduced by the arresting officer as Exhibit No. 1, that states the following: ‚ On August 22, 2015, I witnessed a gray Mazda vehicle swerve and hit mail box on Right hand side of road while traveling on Neuse Rd.‚ The arresting officer also noted that the driver displayed signs of intoxication, including an odor of alcohol, swaying, and red, glassy eyes. At 9:45 p.m., the arresting officer asked the driver to blow into a portable alcohol sensor, which indicated a BAC of 0.20 at that time. The arresting officer arrested the driver on charges of DWI and recklessdrivingand transported her to the law enforcement center, where she was given the opportunity to submit to a breathalyzer BAC test. The arresting officer described driver's failure to provide sufficient breath for an adequate sample, which he recorded as a refusal to be tested. When determining whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the driver had committed the offense of DWI, the DMV hearing officer could consider the officer's observations and information provided by Ms. Titus. Based on his own observations at the scene of the accident, the arresting officer knew the petitioner to be highly intoxicated at the time the officer first saw him. Based on information given him at the scene by a disinterested eyewitness to the accident, the officer had grounds to believe that only a short time previously the petitioner haddrivenhis truck on the highway. Probable cause ‚ may be based upon information given to the officer by another, the source of such information being reasonably reliable.‚ Thus, the arresting officer had information amply sufficient to provide him with probable cause to believe that petitioner had committed the misdemeanor for which the officer arrested him. Our Supreme Court has held that the fact that a motorist has been drinking, when considered in connection with faultydriving or other conduct indicating impairmentof physical or mental faculties, is sufficientprima facieto show a violation of the crime of driving while impaired. The court of appeals concluded that the arresting officer's personal observations, in conjunction with his interview of Ms. Titus, was sufficient to support the DMV hearing officer's finding and conclusion that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that driver had committed the offense ofdrivingwhileimpaired. Thus, the court reinstated Hopkins' 12-month drivers' license suspension for refusing to submit to a chemical analysis after being property charged with driving while impaired.

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